

Thos. O'Flaherty

1481

Second Edition.

AN

EXAMINATION

INTO THE

PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN A PAMPHLET,

ENTITLED THE

SPEECH OF LORD MINTO,

WITH SOME

REMARKS UPON A PAMPHLET,

ENTITLED

OBSERVATIONS ON THAT PART OF THE SPEAKER'S
SPEECH WHICH RELATES TO TRADE.

Ἀπλὸς ὁ μῦθος τῆς Ἀληθείας ἐφυ,
Κ' ἐ ποικίλων δειτὰ ἐνδίκ' ἐρμηνευμάτων,
ἔχει γὰρ αὐτὰ καιρὸν, ὃ δ' ἀδίκος λόγος
Νοσῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, φαρμακῶν δίδωκε σοφῶν.

EURIPIDES.

Simple by Nature is the speech of *Truth*;
Fair reasonings need no various glosses,
For they have soundness; but the *unfair*,
Distempered in itself, requires sophistic salves.

Irish Pursuits of Literature.

BY THE RIGHT HON. BARRY, EARL FARNHAM.

H. Marshall (R.)

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—♦♦♦—

1800.

Handwritten signature or initials at the top of the page.

THE BRITISH MUSEUM

HOITAMAXX



AN

EXAMINATION,

&c. &c.

MY LORD,

I HAVE read your lordship's speech with the attention that it deserves ; it has been composed with much consideration, and logically arranged. Your first position, that from the relative situation of Great Britain and Ireland, a connexion is necessary for their mutual security, is so evident, that it needs not argument to support it. The real question for consideration is, (as you properly express it) what is the best and most eligible form of such connexion.

Your second position is, " That when two countries are so circumstanced as mutually to require connexion, the *only* mode of connexion which can perfectly remove the evil of separation, and fully confer the benefit of Union,

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is a *perfect identity* and *incorporation of their government.*" From this position, you declare it to be your decided opinion, that if the intended connexion between Great Britain and Ireland be not such as shall produce a *perfect identity and incorporation of their government*, it will not remove the evil of separation, or confer the benefit of Union. It will therefore be a proper subject for enquiry, whether the Union intended to be formed between these two nations, constituting distinct islands, and adjusted in such manner as may be agreeable to the outlines of the plan laid before his Majesty by the British parliament, will so perfectly *identify* and *incorporate* their government, as that there shall not remain any solid distinctness of interest between them: the professed object of such Union being, that it shall be so formed, as by consolidating those nations, to remove all danger of separation. The present connection between Great Britain and Ireland, has for many centuries, maintained their Union; it has arisen from the only natural bond which can form a permanent cement between two nations, that of their mutual interest. To this has been added the most powerful artificial measure that can bind two nations, the irrevocable act of the legislature. I say *irrevocable*, as Ireland, under its *present* constitution, has not a power to repeal it. From the experience we have had of its salutary and powerful effects, there is
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not any reason to apprehend that such connexion shall not continue, so long as it shall be their mutual interest to support it. Alteration in their mode of connexion may be attended with great danger, and it appears to me unwise to listen to the wild speculations of empires, and substitute a new system in the place of that, the advantage of which we have for such a length of time experienced; an exchange which may occasion the destruction of our constitution, and a separation between the two united kingdoms. Your lordship refers to preceding Unions which have taken place in Great Britain, that of the heptarchy, the Union of England with Wales, and lastly, that which was formed between England and Scotland. You observe that all those Unions were of great advantage to the nations which formed them; and argue from analogy, that similar benefits must flow from an Union between Great Britain and Ireland. Such reasoning would apply with great force, if Ireland stood in the same relative situation to Great Britain in which Wales and Scotland did to England, and that the Union now in contemplation could affect that *perfect identity of government* between Great Britain and Ireland, which was produced by the Union of those nations with England.

All those nations were part of the same island, and nature pointed out the propriety of their constituting one kingdom. From the time
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of their Union they have been as perfectly identified as if they had never formed distinct kingdoms; the royal functions throughout all are executed by the king *personally*, the produce of their revenues all form one aggregate fund, applicable to the general expences of the united kingdoms, the intercourse of trade is carried on with the same facility, as between the respective parts of any of them, their parliament meets in their capital, and the representatives of all those united kingdoms attend it without difficulty or inconvenience. Being so perfectly identified by nature and situation, there subsists no distinctness of interest between them, their parliament is so essentially interested in the general welfare of the *whole*, that it cannot be induced to act with partiality towards any of its parts, sitting in the capital contiguous to the boards of revenue, treasury, trade and others, it can daily and hourly receive every necessary article of information in their departments, all these are necessary concomitants of perfect identification. Let us now compare the state of Ireland with theirs in those particulars, should the proposed Union take place. The royal functions will still be executed by a viceroy assisted by a privy council, the produce of the respective revenues of Ireland and Great Britain will still create distinct funds, distinctly applicable to the expences of the respective kingdoms; the taxes imposed by the joint legislature are not to extend

extend alike to the whole united Empire, but to affect Great Britain and Ireland separately; the commercial intercourse between both islands will still be carried on, through the medium of distinct revenue officers, according to an adjustment of reciprocal duties, founded upon similar principles with the treaty of commerce between France and Great Britain; the attendance upon Parliament of the Irish members will be in another island, with no slight inconvenience and with much additional expence, far beyond the means perhaps of many who may be delegated. While from the unavoidable distinctness of their local and commercial interest, Ireland can scarcely hope for a perfect impartiality and an unbiassed attention to her peculiar concerns, in the parliament assembled at Westminster, the British members will no doubt avail themselves of the preponderancy of their majority, and apply it to the interest of that country which they represent. Such real and substantial difference as I have pointed out, will I trust convince your Lordship, that the two nations will not be easily identified, and that the inferences drawn from the benefits which England, Wales and Scotland derive from their joint parliamentary Union, by no means apply to the projected Union between Great Britain and Ireland. The propositions laid before his Majesty intimate, that each nation is to defray the expence of her own sinking fund, that Ireland,

land is to pay a certain *proportion* of the ordinary expences of the united kingdoms, and that the duties to arise from their commercial intercourse are to constitute part of the revenue of that kingdom into which the commodities shall be imported. From these provisions it necessary follows, that their respective revenues must still be kept perfectly distinct; that each nation must still have its separate boards of treasury, revenue and accounts, as at present will not this necessarily be productive of distinct interests between the two nations; in truth, I scarcely know any substantial distinctness now subsisting between Great Britain and Ireland under their present connexion, which will not continue after the proposed Union, save that very material one, that Ireland shall be deprived of that distinct and independent Parliament which belongs to her, under her present Constitution. Whether the consequences of such a change will be salutary or injurious, it behoves every Irishman to consider well before he shall consent to merge his own in the united parliament. At present the parliament of Ireland sits in her capital, and every member can attend it, without inconvenience; its whole attention is centered in Irish affairs, each member shares in the operation of every law enacted and feels every tax imposed; her parliament sitting in Dublin can receive without difficulty or delay from her own boards of revenue, treasury or accounts,

accounts, every necessary information concerning such matters as belong to their respective departments, her Lawyers and Merchants may then constitute a part of such parliament from whom every necessary information within their peculiar province, respecting the laws and commerce of Ireland may be obtained. By means of the appellate jurisdiction lately restored to the Irish parliament, the suitor can have his cause finally determined at home, without the trouble, expence and delay of restoring to another court of supreme judicature abroad. The members from their residence, their station, and their intercourse with its inhabitants must necessarily be the best judges of the ability of the people, to support the taxes to be imposed. and of the ways and means which will render them least oppressive, and of such laws as may be best adapted to their internal regulation.

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These are the *solid* and *substantial* advantages which Ireland may expect from retaining her own parliament, I trust they will fix her determination not to yield to wild speculations but to adhere to that Constitution. the salutary effects of which she has felt since the time that it has been established.

Having thus pointed out such important distinctnesses in the government and in the interests between the two nations which must subsist, if the intended Union between them shall be effected,
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surely my Lord, you who have *asserted*, "that the abolition of the Privy Council of Scotland was necessary to *consolidate* the Union, by removing that remaining *nucleus* of a local government, and *separate interest*," (fol. 92) cannot think, that a Union accompanied with all the foregoing distinctnesses of viceroy, privy-council, revenues and expences, will produce that perfect identity and incorporation of their government which you represent as the *only* mode of connexion which can *perfectly* remove the evils of separation, and confer the benefit of Union. The principle of the intended Union we are told is, that it will effectually remove the danger of separation between Great Britain and Ireland. I am of opinion that danger will rather be increased. The real object which has induced Great Britain to press this measure by means of promises and menaces, rewards and punishments, is very far from that which she professes.

To the Protestant is held out, protection against the Catholic, who is represented as still retaining claims not only upon their liberties, but also upon their properties. To the Catholic, fallacious expectations are held out of being admitted into Parliament, and being placed upon a level with the Protestants in point of political power. Far be it from me, however, to insinuate that such expectations have originated from the Parliament of Great Britain; their language has been manly and

and direct, and authorises no such delusive hopes as the understrappers of administration have held out to them.

The ostensible argument in favour of the Union arises from *supposed* apprehensions being entertained of a separation between the two kingdoms. Be assured, that this is a mere pretence, and that when it is considered for what a great length of time those nations have continued united under the present connexion, such apprehensions cannot be *really* entertained. The real motive that lurks in the bottom of this measure I suspect to be widely different; to me it appears, that the recovery of reluctantly relinquished power is the real object of the British minister. It is to recover the power of binding Ireland by her acts of Parliament. This right asserted in the British act of the 6th Geo. 1st she exercised until she lost America; then, indeed, she reluctantly yielded to the nervous exertion of the Irish Parliament, and consented that Ireland should have a Constitution founded upon the basis of British freedom. And how reluctantly this emancipation of Ireland was granted, clearly appears from the Duke of Portland's correspondence in 1782, lately, and perhaps, *unwittingly* produced by Mr. Pitt; and from the assiduous exertions of Mr. Pitt to do away that Parliamentary Constitution of Ireland, which was *solemnly* adjusted in 1782, by denying that it was intended to be a *final* adjustment of

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constitutional questions between both nations. The British Cabinet now seems anxious to re-assume that power in its fullest extent, claimed by the 6th Geo. 1st of binding Ireland in *all cases* whatsoever, thus including the momentous and alarming power of taxation; this in truth appears to me the great object of the minister's exertions.—He wishes that the power over the whole property of the kingdom of Ireland should be at his disposal; and how is this to be effected? by Ireland's transferring a part of her Parliament to be added to that of Great Britain, such part sufficient to *legalize* the acts of such united Parliament, under the *flimsy* pretence of Ireland's being represented there, although such insignificant part will not give her any more power in such Parliament, than she would have had if she was not represented in it at all.

If the parliament of Ireland shall be once melted down into an united parliament, the power which she now has over her liberty and property, will be thereby transferred to the disposal of the preponderating majority which Great Britain will have in such united parliament. Ireland should well consider that if she once gives up her own parliament, the act cannot be recalled.—Should the articles be infringed, she will be left without redress; there is not any tribunal upon earth to which she can appeal. He is little read in the book of mankind who expects to have good faith

faith observed between nations, where it is inconsistent with their interest. Let Ireland consider, that by giving up her parliament, she parts with the only sole security she can have for her liberties, and will thenceforth hold them, at the precarious tenure of the liberality and good will of the British majority in the united parliament.

I now proceed to that part of your lordship's speech relative to the internal and political regimen of Ireland. You observe, that nothing "can be less rational, or more dangerous, and often fatal, than *abstract* views of practical questions affecting the interests of multitudes and of nations; that in the pursuit of abstract right, we shall often find ourselves (innocently, no doubt, if our intention is considered, but yet too effectually) the instruments of great *practical injustice and oppression*, that there are *few cases* to which that observation applies more closely, than that which you are considering." (fol. 72.) It appears to me rather extraordinary, that your lordship, entertaining ideas of the danger of such *abstract views*, should enter into the discussion of such; and the more so, if it should appear that your mode of treating them is of a hazardous tendency, originating perhaps, from want of due information respecting the present state of Ireland. You assert, "that Ireland is a divided country as to property and numbers, the least numerous class (alluding I presume to the *Protestants*) possessing

fessing the property and the power ; the more numerous (the Catholics) entertaining claims both on the property and the power." So far as relates to the division of property and power, your representation appears to me to be well founded.— You next state the violence "of those passions which influence and exasperate both parts of the Irish nation against each other, the firm and immoveable basis on which their mutual hatred stands, the irreconcilable nature of its motives, its bitter, malignant, and implacable character. You represent them as two nations in Ireland, two Irish peoples ; the one sovereign, the other subject. You consider them as two enraged and implacable opponents, shut up on the very arena of their ancient and furious contentions. To me the tendency of such representations appears calculated to stimulate animosity between the two parties, by impressing an idea on their minds, that an inveterate hatred subsists between them, which is rooted in such principles, and actuated by such motives, as must make it continue for ever.

But to shew how totally unfounded these assertions are, I shall appeal to the parliamentary transactions in Ireland for the last twenty two years. Until the year 1777, the penal statutes affecting Catholics remained in force. From the time of their enactment, the Catholics had conducted themselves peaceably and loyally. Two rebellions had taken place in Scotland, notwithstanding

standing the Union ; the one in 1715, and the other in 1745 ; in the course of which, the Irish Catholics (though strongly solicited) took no share. Such conduct naturally conciliated the regards and assuaged the prejudices of their Protestant brethren, who were convinced that the penal statutes might with safety be repealed.—Parliament chearfully and freely engaged in that laudable business, warmly wishing to contribute to the happiness and comfort of their fellow-subjects, and enacted the statutes of the 17th and 18th of Geo. III. whereby, after reciting, that from the uniform peaceable behaviour of the Catholics for a long series of years, it was expedient to relax those laws, that it would tend to the prosperity and strength of all his Majesty's dominions, that his subjects of all denominations should enjoy the blessings of a free constitution, and should be bound to each other by mutual interest and mutual affection ; for these purposes, therefore, they enacted, that persons professing the popish religion should be capable to take, hold and enjoy, any leases for years, not exceeding 999 years, should have full power of disposing of them, or of any estates, whereof they were, or to which they should become entitled ; that they be capable of taking any estate by descent ; that no maintenance or portion should be granted to a child of a popish parent, upon a bill filed against such parent ; that it should not be in the
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power of the eldest son of a popish parent, to make his father tenant for life, by conforming, but that the father, notwithstanding such conformity, should have full power over his estate, thereby repealing all those laws which were most grievous and galling to the Catholics of Ireland. The remaining disability to purchase the inheritance, subjecting Catholics to many legal inconveniences, peculiar to chattel interests; the act of the 21st and 22d Geo. III. was made, whereby Catholics were enabled to purchase the inheritance, their estates made descendible according to the course of the common law; the penal laws against popish ecclesiasticks, upon their taking the oaths appointed by the 14th and 15th Geo. III. and several other laws, subjecting Catholics to disabilities, were repealed. This liberal act fully compleated the wish of the Catholics at that time, they felt and expressed the warmest gratitude to that parliament, for such substantial proofs of their friendship and good will; the Protestants and Catholics became as one family, and the most perfect cordiality appeared to subsist between them; the power of acquisition and disposal of property was equally enjoyed by Protestants and Catholics.

Things remained in that state of increasing harmony for several years, until Great Britain having complied with the wishes of the British *protesting* Catholics, enabled them to act as barristers, attorneys,

attornies, and solicitors, in the British courts of justice. The Irish parliament immediately followed their example, and by stat. 32 Geo. III. conferred on the Irish Catholics, similar privileges, and at the same time repealed such remaining penal laws as still subsisted in the statute book, however obsolete; whose repeal, therefore, as being rather immaterial, had been before neglected. In the next session also, the parliament even outstripped the most sanguine wishes of the Catholic body in Ireland, and the bounty of a British parliament, by admitting them to the elective franchise, and enabling them to take and enjoy every civil and military employment, the judicial department, and a few of the highest offices of administration only excepted. And do such liberal concessions, such substantial grants on the part of the Irish legislature, far outstripping the liberality of Great Britain to her *protesting* Catholics, intimate, that a bitter, malignant, and implacable hatred subsists between the Irish Protestants and Catholics? No, surely. Your lordship has been strangely misinformed. These facts, I conceive, fully refute that charge, and are sufficient to satisfy the Catholics, that their Protestant brethren ardently wish to unite with them in heart and hand, and in every respect to contribute to their happiness, as far as is consistent with the established constitution in church and state.

After

After this injurious *mistatement* of the disposition of the Protestants and Catholics of Ireland towards each other, you next proceed to venture upon the *delicate and hazardous question of abstract rights*. You say that you cannot "admit of the ascendancy of one part of the nation over another part of the same nation, to the extent and purpose claimed in Ireland, as capable of assuming any character deserving the denomination of right. That which is wrong on one side, cannot intelligibly to you become right on the other. You do not think the virtues of *possession, prescription*, or any other limitation of time at all applicable to the case of perpetually subsisting, and as it were renovating wrongs, especially such as affect the *political rights* of great numbers of men. That the frequency of the repetition of wrongs, instead of diminishing the injury, must be felt as a grievous aggravation of it; and instead of converting wrong into right, seems only to *improve and fortify* the title of those who suffer, to shake off the injury on the first opportunity that offers. You say that part of Ireland which you wish to redress, claims not only *political equality* in the government of their country, in which you cannot help *sympathizing* with them, but are known to entertain *claims of a very different nature*." How revolutionary is this mode of reasoning? How inflammatory, how perfectly does it coincide with the principles broached by Paine, in his Rights
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of Man? Does it not tend to awaken discontents among the Catholics of Ireland, to justify their resorting to first principles, to vindicate their political *equality*, to authorise downright rebellion? Is not all this, treason against the Constitution which it encourages the Catholics to overturn? And may not government be fairly taxed with countenancing those principles adopted by your lordship? They have circulated, as I am informed, at the public cost, your elaborate speech, although the printer of Paine's Rights of Man, founded upon the *very same principles*, has been prosecuted and punished in England. If I understand your lordship, you consider every part of his Majesty's subjects entitled to an equality of civil and political rights, and that it is an act of *injustice* to the Catholic to deprive him of a participation of them. The exclusion of the Catholics from a share in the legislature results from *the oath of supremacy*, which is required to be taken by persons of *every persuasion*, previous to their admission into parliament. This oath relates merely to the *political*, not the *religious* tenets of the Catholics. I will state for your information the introduction of that oath. Immediately after the revolution, by the *English* stat. 1st of William and Mary, it was enjoined to be taken by every person before his admission into the *English* Parliament; by the *English* stat. of 3d William and Mary, it was enacted, that it should be taken before any person should

be permitted to sit in the *Irish* parliament ; for at that time the English Parliament did claim the right, and did actually exercise the power of binding Ireland by its laws. The exclusion, therefore, of the Catholics from sitting in Parliament was the act of the *English* Legislature, not of that *part of the Irish People* whom you consider as *unduly invested with legislative power*. If such exclusion from an equality of political rights be a wrong, it is a wrong enacted by the *English* Parliament, not by the *Irish*, who in fact never made any law to that effect, until after the restoration of their legislative Constitution in 1782, at which time they by an act of their own, adopted *generally* all those English laws, which related to the taking of such oaths. The political creed of the English Catholic being the same with that of the Irish, equally induces the expediency of enjoining the oath of supremacy to be taken in both countries, and excludes *both* from a share in the legislature. If such exclusion then be a wrong to the Irish Catholic, it must be a wrong to the English Catholic also. The distinctions of right and wrong equally apply to both, surely the ascendancy of *one part* of a nation over *another part* of the same nation, cannot assume the denomination of right in the one kingdom, and that of wrong in the other. Your Lordship's feelings are alive to the oppression of the *Irish* Catholic, occasioned by his being deprived of an equality of political

political rights by the *English* Parliament, and you sympathise with him on account of that injustice committed by an English Parliament. But your compassion does not extend to the *British* Catholic who is in the very same predicament, and who suffers the very same wrongs. Are the principles of right and wrong different in Ireland and Great Britain? The Irish Protestant has been by the foregoing English act subjected to the same penalties and disabilities, if he shall omit to take the oaths, and there are instances where the punishment for omission has been inflicted upon the Protestant both in England and Ireland. Thus, my Lord, the censure which you levelled against the *Irish* Parliament, recoils against the *English*. I am happy, however, to be able to vindicate the wisdom and justice of the English Parliament in excluding persons from a share in the legislature, who professed such political principles as are avowed by persons of the Catholic persuasion in Great Britain and Ireland. By the Constitution the King is supreme head of the Church; his power both in temporals and spirituals, is limited to the laws of the land. It is contrary to every sound political principle of Government, that any powers should be exercised therein, save such as are consistent with the Constitution; the king is as much bound by the laws as the meanest of his subjects; every person partaking of the benefits of the Constitution, is bound to *obey the King* in all

all his just prerogatives. This it is which creates the allegiance due by the subject to the king, and enables *him* to afford reciprocal protection to the subject. The oath required to be taken consists of two parts :—1st, The member is to swear that he *abhors, detests, and abjures that damnable doctrine and position, that princes excommunicated or deprived by the pope, may be murdered and deposed by their subjects*. No person will attempt to maintain, that a man entertaining such detestable principles, is fit to be admitted into the legislature. Secondly, the oath declares, *that no foreign prince, prelate, state or potentate, has, or ought to have, any jurisdiction, power or authority, within this realm*. To this part of the oath the Catholic objects, as repugnant to his creed, which maintains, that the pope has absolute power and authority within this realm in all matters *spiritual or ecclesiastical*. No article of faith is contained in the said oath, it is merely *political*, and relates only to ecclesiastical government ; it only excludes from parliament such persons as support a power in the *pope*, which the constitution has vested in the crown. The principle which it opposes, aims to introduce a foreign power into this realm, absolute in its nature, above all law, uncontrouled and uncontrollable, and utterly repugnant to the fundamental principles of the constitution. Surely the establishment of such a power would be in fact to subject the *crown* in spirituals, to the authority of the pope. The Catholic who supports such power
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thereby acknowledges himself the *subject* of the person who is invested therewith, he divides his *allegiance*, he professes himself subject to the king in *temporals*, and to the pope in *spirituals*. That such are the tenets of the catholics, appears from Doctor Hufsey's Pastoral Letter: addressing himself to the soldiers he says, "their personal religion is their natural incontrovertible imprescriptible right, subject to the spiritual authority of the Catholic Church, and in which the laws of the land cannot enjoy a coercive authority. In all *temporal* matters, they are subject to their temporal rulers in all *spiritual* matters they are subject to their spiritual rulers;" how then can a legislature vesting and establishing the supremacy of the church in the crown, disclaiming and resisting the authority of any foreign power within the realm, admit persons into their body whose tenets are so repugnant to their own? These observations will I trust vindicate the propriety of the English parliament in framing for Ireland such a political test. Your Lordship will also observe, that every argument which you adduce, to prove the injustice of excluding catholics from the Irish parliament, militates with equal force against their exclusion from the British, and with what consistency, my Lord, do you impeach the Irish parliament, representing it as inadequate to make laws for binding Catholics, after having contended for the omnipotency of that very parliament, and re-

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presented it as invested with sufficient power to bind for ever those very catholics by an incorporative Union with Great Britain, in the formation of which, it appears from the propositions laid before his Majesty, and supported by your Lordship, that the very same oaths are required to be taken by the members of the united parliament, as are now prescribed to be taken by the members of the respective parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland. I decline entering into the abstract view of the competency of parliament, to substitute another Constitution in the place of *that*, for the preservation of which they have been invested with their legislative functions; it is a question of so dangerous a tendency, and upon which such a diversity of opinions has prevailed among men of the first abilities, that I shall not venture to enter upon the consideration of it; but this much I shall venture to affirm, that if the formation of the parliament of Ireland be so vicious and defective as you represent, it cannot be competent to bind the catholics by establishing such articles of Union as shall exclude *them for ever* from participating in the legislature of the united kingdoms. Expectations have been held out to the catholics that those laws of exclusion will be altered by the united parliament: whether there be any reasonable foundation for such expectation, will be best ascertained by taking a retrospective view of the conduct of parliament since the
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Revolution. There are in Great Britain as well as in Ireland a considerable number of catholics, though not in so great a proportion to the protestants, the English legislature have required such oaths to be taken by members before their admission into parliament as have excluded catholics from sitting in it; they are in Great Britain deprived of the elective franchise, they are rendered incapable of enjoying any employment, civil or military, in that kingdom. An attempt was made not many years ago in the British parliament to repeal the Test Act, but without effect. In the present case the British parliament by the propositions which they have laid before his Majesty, acted fairly and openly by the catholics; they have *constitutionally* declared, that the Churches of England and Ireland, and the doctrine, worship, discipline and government thereof shall be preserved as by law established, thereby affirming, and securing the ascendancy of the protestant religion and the king's *supremacy* in the government of the church; they have declared that the same oaths now in force shall continue to be taken by the members of the united parliament. When such then is the language of parliament, how unwarrantable must it be in individuals to use endeavours to impose upon the catholics by holding out to them expectations totally incompatible with the spirit and meaning of the propositions themselves. Compare the condition of the Irish

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Catholic with that of the British; in Ireland he has the elective franchise, and is capable of enjoying every office, civil and military, a few only excepted, from all which the British catholic is excluded. Your Lordship, notwithstanding your feelings for the Irish catholics, has never attempted to procure for the *British* catholic the rights and privileges which the *Irish* catholic enjoys. Should an Union take place, no distinction can be made between the catholics of the united kingdoms, either the British catholic must be raised to the level of the Irish catholic, or the Irish lowered to the level of the British. This measure of adjustment must be determined by the united parliament, where British influence must always predominate, and can it be expected that the great British majority will concede to the Irish minority? That the standard of adjustment will probably be lowered, may be collected still further from the sagacious conjecture of that eminent statesman Lord Auckland, who expresses himself thus; "it has long been my opinion, that whatever maybe the indulgences, more or less limited, to the catholics of England, the measure of those indulgences ought to guide our discretion with respect to the catholics of Ireland." Whither the Irish catholic is more likely to be raised or depressed by the proposed Union, I leave to the sagacity of the most intelligent Catholics to decide, from the foregoing observations; earnestly wishing

wishing that they may not feed themselves with vain hopes of further concessions which will never be realized. The illiberal and mischievous policy of ruling by division in order to rule by *Union*, I am sorry to observe, seems to be your maxim as well as that of several other ministerial grand speakers on the imperial question of *Union*. But let me tell you, my Lord, honesty is the best policy between states, as between individuals. The torch of discord has been unhappily kindled in Ireland, and has blazed out into insurrection, and open rebellion. It has been the fashion to attribute it principally to popish fanaticism, but I apprehend, without sufficient foundation; the primary promoters of that rebellion were protestants and presbyterians as well as romanists, and the hostility of the united conspirators was levelled against all religious establishments, although they endeavoured to avail themselves of the political engines of superstition and bigotry. This clearly appeared upon the examination of the leaders of the conspiracy before the parliamentary committees; their object was the same with that of the English and Scotch conspirators, all were actuated by the same jacobinical principles; they wished to overturn the civil and religious government of both kingdoms, and to substitute in its place the anarchy and confusion of a democratic republic on the miserable model of France. The Irish rebels did not limit their revolutionary

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 views, as has been insinuated by your Lordship, to regain the forfeited lands of which they considered themselves to have been unjustly deprived. Few indeed engaged in that rebellion had any such claims to urge; their views extended to a new partition of the whole landed property of Ireland among themselves. In England also and Scotland, as well as in Ireland, the same revolutionary principles were unremittingly propagated and disseminated, where the Romish religion had small comparative influence. The reports of the parliamentary committees prove its progress through Great Britain. It appeared *there* sufficient to authorise the enacting of such laws, as the necessity of the case could alone justify. At that time Great Britain was secured by a great military force, Ireland was in a most defenceless state, France clearly saw that Great Britain was most vulnerable in that part of her Empire, she applied herself with redoubled activity to diffuse her principles among the Irish people, with whom from their poverty and ignorance she had the greatest prospect of success. The object of the rebels was to overturn all government, which necessarily would have produced a separation between Great Britain and Ireland. Let the loyal Irish compare the state their country would have been in, if at the time the rebellion broke out, the parliament melted down into that of Great Britain had been sitting at Westminster and
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one hundred and thirty-two of her most distinguished characters for talents and property, engaged in attending that parliament, with that in which she then stood, assisted by a parliament of her own, sitting in her capital, whose most diligent attention was exerted, in investigating and defeating the machinations of the rebels, and whose principal gentry exercised their utmost influence in preserving and restoring good order and tranquillity among the inhabitants of their respective estates. Believe me, my Lord, the indefatigable industry of the Irish Houses of Parliament and of the resident gentry, were under Providence the powerful means by which that rebellion was counteracted and suppressed. The meritorious conduct therefore of the Irish parliament furnishes a most forcible additional argument against its extinction. Whilst Ireland has a Constitution worth preserving, she will ever apply her most strenuous exertions in its support, her parliament she considers as the only security for the permanent preservation of the liberty she now enjoys. You have taken a review of the present Constitution of Ireland to shew that she is not an independent nation, in which I perfectly agree with you, the act of annexation of the crown of Ireland to that of Great Britain, the act of 1782, by which the legislative functions of the sovereign of Ireland can only be performed through the Great Seal of Great Britain, speak
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in the strongest language, the superiority of Great Britain over Ireland. The administration of the executive government of Ireland by a viceroy (which must still continue if the Union should take place) in another instance to which you resort, to prove her superiority over Ireland. I do not only *acknowledge* her superiority in those instances, but I consider such as necessary to her prosperity. In all imperial concerns Ireland ought to follow in the wake of Great Britain, the sole power of making war and peace, entering into treaties with foreign powers is vested in the king of Great Britain by virtue of his royal prerogative, in all these particulars (as Blackstone expresses it) the Constitution considers him as the representative of the people but it has been observed that although those powers are vested in the crown yet the support of a war depends upon the concurrent will of the parliament. History does not furnish one instance where parliament has withheld such support; the motive which has produced this uniform concurrence with the Crown is that, which ever will produce the same effect, self interest and self preservation; this must operate with greater force upon Ireland than upon Great Britain, as she in such a case would be much more defenceless; wherefore since Great Britain under the present mode of connexion between her and Ireland, is by *your own statement* invested with all those powers in imperial concerns,

concerns, which are necessary for the government of the Empire, I cannot find any occasion upon *that account* to resort to an incorporating Union.

A private correspondence between the Duke of Portland and Lord Shelburne in May and June 1782 has been rather unguardedly produced to the public by Mr. Pitt, which his Grace states to be *so delicate in its nature, requiring so much secrecy and management*, that he would not trust the communication of it to any hand but his own. I shall decline making any comment upon the nature of that transaction. Ireland however *may* profit from its being made public. The object of the acts of Parliament then in the contemplation of his Grace were, that the superintending power and supremacy of Great Britain in all matters of state and general commerce, should be virtually and effectually acknowledged; but your Lordship has clearly shewn, that without any such act of Parliament, Great Britain is already invested with such powers. Another object in his contemplation was, that the share of the expence in carrying on a defensive or offensive war, either in the defence of our dominions or those of our allies, should be borne by Ireland in proportion to the actual state of her abilities. To this part of his plan, I do not imagine that any objection could reasonably be made by Ireland; participating as she now does in the commerce of Great Britain, she is bound to contribute her proportion
to

to the protection of the Empire of which she constitutes an essential part. He further proceeds, that Ireland should adopt such regulations as may be judged necessary by Great Britain for the better ordering and regulating the trade and commerce with foreign nations and her own colonies and dependencies, consideration being duly had to the circumstances of Ireland; this part of the plan also appears unobjectionable. These are the great objects which are avowed to be expected from the Union, and it appears that the corresponding parties *then* thought that they could be secured by such acts of parliament as they described, without depriving Ireland of her present constitution.

Your lordship having pointed out all those instances in which Ireland is dependant on Great Britain, I shall advert to those particulars in which I consider Ireland as independent under her present constitution. She now has the sole and exclusive right of making laws for her internal regulation and taxation; for although it may be said that she has not *absolutely* the power of enacting any law, as it must be first ratified under the great seal of Great Britain, yet she has a moral certainty, from the interest which Great Britain must necessarily take in the prosperity of Ireland, that such ratification will never be withheld by the executive of Great Britain, unless in cases where such law may be really injurious to her;
nor

nor is there more reason to apprehend that the king shall refuse his royal assent to bills really useful and expedient to the public, than that he should refuse to permit the great seal of Great Britain to be annexed to them. Upon those powers therefore, with which her own Parliament is invested, Ireland relies, as the foundation on which her liberties are to be supported. The interest of Great Britain is intimately interwoven with that of Ireland; the strength, the opulence, the prosperity of Ireland, are the strength, the opulence, and the prosperity of the sister kingdom; Ireland must stand and fall with Great Britain. This measure of an Union is *pressed* upon Ireland, not *required* by her. The language held forth by Mr. Pitt, Lord Auckland, and others of the ministerial phalanx, has been that of persuasion mingled with menace, extolling the great advantages in commerce which Ireland enjoys through British bounty, their precarious tenure depending on the good will and pleasure of a British parliament, at the same time insinuating the danger of their being withdrawn, should Ireland refuse this great boon now tendered to her, alledging that her protection depends upon the strength of Great Britain, which might perhaps be withdrawn from her. Such indirect menaces need not alarm Ireland; she well knows that the continuance of those benefits depends upon the best possible security, the interest of Great Britain, that she
 should

should continue to enjoy them. In truth, mutual interest is the only cement which can bind nations; it is that which has preserved the connexion of these kingdoms for so many centuries. To the powerful aid of that connexion and efficacious co-operation of Ireland, is surely to be attributed much of the high rank and proud station in which Great Britain now stands, as the bulwark of the liberties of Europe. *Your* language upon this part of the subject has indeed materially differed from that of others of the ministerial phalanx; and it is but justice to your principles of liberality and sound policy, indicating the enlarged mind of a profound statesman, to state, that (according to your representation) Ireland has a perfect right to claim in times of danger, whether "from foreign or domestic enemies, the protection of the British navy and military, as well as securing aid; that the preservation of Ireland is an English interest, and sufficiently precious to call for those exertions, even in a distinct and separate view of her own advantage; in the next place that she is entitled to it, as she is at all times contributory to the general service and security; that her seamen, her soldiers, and her revenue all augment the general stock of British resources; that if peculiar and temporary emergencies have at this or any other particular period, encreased the local demands of Ireland upon the exertions of Great Britain, the scene of danger may at other times

be

securing

be shifted, and that there are recent grounds to be convinced that she will be ready to make extraordinary exertions upon extraordinary danger, in Great Britain, if such occasions should arise. That in respect to the extensive commerce from without, and prosperous manufactures from within, which flow from a free participation of the imperial greatness of Great Britain, these upon a view of the present connexion with Great Britain, belong to the very nature of the case, and naturally flow from the sentiments of fraternity and reciprocal kindness, which should accompany such a connexion; that such favours are prompted by a liberal, but at the same time by a wise policy." This is, indeed, my lord, the true and rational principle upon which the connexion between Great Britain and Ireland should subsist; and such connexion would never have been formed, but from an expectation of mutual advantages. Every increase of prosperity which Ireland receives, contributes to the strength and prosperity of the British empire; and most justly does your lordship observe, "if identity of constitution be not founded on *identity of interest*, and is not followed by identity of sentiment and feeling towards the united empire, such an Union will not cure the evils of imperfect relation, or even separation, but may bring some of them nearer and more home to both." (fol. 60.)—This indeed is an observation well deserving the

most *serious* attention. The great object now held out to induce these two nations to adopt this measure of an incorporating Union is, that it will preclude all danger of separation. No man can feel more strongly than I do the ruinous consequences that would ensue from separation ; and therefore, upon that very ground I deprecate such Union. I presume it will be admitted as an incontrovertible position, that mutual interest and reciprocity of advantages are the only strong and permanent bonds of Union between two nations. Their Union will continue so long as their mutual interest prompts them to it ; no acts of parliament will bind them longer, than whilst the connexion continues to be useful to them ; The present connexion has for many centuries preserved their Union, each nation has felt the reciprocal assistance which they afforded to each other. Great Britain was entitled to a superiority in all imperial concerns, and has enjoyed it. To the acquisition and peopling of her extensive colonies, Ireland has largely contributed ; still, however, Great Britain for a long time was so blind to her own interest, as to grudge to Ireland a participation of colonial commerce. We may further observe, that although the British parliament has occasionally exercised the power of making laws for the internal regulation of Ireland, she never attempted to interfere with her *internal taxation*,
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that power having been solely exercised by her own parliament. The dangerous consequences of attempting to impose internal taxation, may be illustrated by the American contest.

In 1770, Great Britain assumed a right of imposing an internal tax upon the article of tea imported into America. This occasioned much discontent; in consequence of which, the act was so far repealed, as to leave only a remaining tax of three pence a pound. This tax was not attempted to be collected, until 1774. At that time, unfortunately, the minister hazarded the experiment, whether America would submit to that unproductive tax, and thereby establish Great Britain's right to tax her. Ship's freighted with tea were sent to Boston for that purpose, with orders to enforce the payment of the duty. The Americans felt the *magnitude* of the precedent, though the tax was *small*. They would not permit the cargoes to be landed, but threw them into the sea. Immediately upon this the Boston port act, and other compulsory acts, were passed, for the purpose of punishing the Americans, and forcing them to submit. This produced no other effect than that of uniting them in opposing the collection of the tax. I need not remind you of the hostile proceedings which followed; but it is proper to observe, that the Americans had neither a navy nor an army, and that it was the universal opinion in Great Britain, that her power was sufficient

sufficient to compel them to submit, if they should dare to resist. Ireland was not an inattentive observer of those proceedings; she assimilated the case of the Americans to her own, and sympathized with them during the progress of the war; she considered, that if Great Britain should establish her power of internal taxation on America, she herself was to become the *next* victim. Unable to cope with Great Britain singly, America was secretly assisted by France. At length, in 1778, the French threw off the mask, and notified by their ambassador to the British minister, that they had formed an offensive and defensive alliance with America. Things then, indeed, assumed a most serious aspect, Great Britain was alarmed, Ireland grew discontented, and her manufacturers were stationary. She exclaimed against the injustice of Great Britain, for withholding from her the colonial trade, and urged it most forcibly in her own parliament. Alarmed by the danger of losing America, Great Britain yielded to the necessity of cultivating the affections of Ireland, and by encreasing Irish resources, to enlarge Irish ability to succour and support her. These considerations induced her to admit Ireland into a share of her trade with the colonies. The crisis at which this took place, may suggest a doubt, whether it proceeded from an enlarged spirit of liberality, or merely of self-interest; I wish I could satisfactorily ascribe it to the former motive.

Starving

motive. The attempt to tax America made a strong impression on the Irish mind. What advantage, they said, could accrue from the enlargement of their trade, if Great Britain should have a power to make laws by which their property might be affected? In 1782, Great Britain acknowledged the independence of America; and learning wisdom from misfortune, she saw the necessity as well as the justice, of yielding to the wishes of Ireland, and of admitting her to share in British freedom. By the constitutional adjustment of that year, the sole power of making laws for the internal regulation and taxation of Ireland was vested in her own parliament. This solemn recognition of her independent legislative power is now considered by Ireland as her Magna Charta. Can we then be surprized, if she be tremblingly alive to any measure which may tend to infringe it?

In 1785, the commercial propositions were introduced in the Irish parliament; they had been framed in Great Britain, and offered by Mr. Orde, for settling the intercourse in commerce between the two nations, and the contribution which was to be furnished by Ireland towards the support of the British navy. The mode of contribution was judiciously planned by regulating it according to the encrease of her commerce.—These propositions were represented by Mr. Orde as perfectly satisfactory to Great Britain; and so
much

much were they approved of in the Irish house of commons, that upon a division, the tellers of opposition had none to tell. These propositions having been sent back again to Great Britain, met with great opposition in the house of commons, chiefly raised by petitions presented against them by the trading interest. They underwent many alterations, and had ten propositions added to them. They were again laid, as altered, by Mr. Orde, before the Irish house of commons, who moved for leave to bring in a bill for establishing them; but upon the discussion of that motion, some of the additional propositions were strongly objected to, as tending to infringe upon the acknowledged independence of the Irish legislature. It is not improbable, that having been introduced as *additional* propositions to those which had been stated as satisfactory to Great Britain (no part of which in any sort pointed to constitutional questions) and the people of Ireland, being particularly jealous at *that time* of any thing which tended to touch upon her constitution so recently established, this circumstance might have created an opposition to matters, which in other circumstances might have passed without notice. Although Mr. Orde's motion was carried by a majority of nineteen, he did not, however, introduce the bill, and no further proceedings were taken towards carrying that measure into effect, he probably judging, that an adjustment

justment of such consequence to the connexion between the two nations, required a more general approbation. Had the bill been introduced, it might perhaps have been so framed, as to remove the particular objections urged against them; but those very propositions contained every thing which related to the commercial interests of Ireland, as fully, equitably, and beneficially to both nations, as can be effected by the proposed Union. Had that bill passed, all the commercial questions under debate would have been adjusted, and the specific contribution ascertained to be had by Ireland towards the support of the navy; and surely such a bill as might have been then brought in, may still be passed, without infringing on the legislative independence of Ireland.— It has been reported, that meetings have been had between the British minister and several persons holding high offices in Ireland, for the purpose of digesting the plan of the intended Union, and that the result in respect of the formation of the united parliament, has been to the following purport: That both houses of the British parliament shall remain in their present state, perfect and entire; that Ireland shall furnish to the house of lords 32 members, namely, 28 lay lords and 4 spiritual, and that 100 members shall be added by Ireland to the British house of commons. In a parliament thus constituted, the Irish lords would make one-tenth of the united house of lords

lords, and the commons amount to one sixth of that body. Such is the intended plan of the united parliament, to be substituted in the place of that which now exists in Ireland. By a parliament thus composed, all laws to affect the united kingdoms are to be enacted ; but what influence can so scanty a proportion of Irish members have upon the decisions of the legislative body ? In the name of common sense, can any one imagine that such laws will not be *actually* made by the preponderating power of the British members ? The determination must ever be the same as if the 100 *cyphers* of Irish members did not sit in such parliament : Irishmen cannot be satisfied with such a mockery of representation.— When they shall feel the increase of their taxes, (which certainly will be the case) they will attribute it to their being laid on by the British members who impose taxes, the weight of which they do not feel, and which they may be induced to lay on, in order to alleviate burthens of their own. Ireland may have abundant reason to compare the taxes to be imposed with those formerly laid on by her own parliament. Irishmen will lament the irremediable change, and their *legal* inability to be restored to their former constitution. Universal discontent may ensue, and what fatal consequences to the peace and tranquillity of the empire may result, and how far it may endanger

danger the connexion between the two islands, I tremble to anticipate.

It has been represented that Ireland is so circumstanced, that she *must* submit to the power of Great Britain; that she has no army, no navy, and no other alternative but to embrace French fraternity, the misery of which cannot be represented in too strong colours. Wretched as the despotism of France is at present, by following wild theories of impracticable government, it is contrary to the nature of things that she should remain for ever in her present state of anarchy; the fever must at length subside, and a rational form of government succeed. She may then gradually recruit her navy, and take her proper station in the scale of Europe, while her inveterate implacable animosity to Great Britain will never subside. She will court every opportunity of humbling that formidable rival, and should discontents at any future period prevail in Ireland, will take every step to foment them. She will not fail to insinuate how grossly Ireland has been duped, by exchanging her independent parliament for the *mockery* of legislative representation. Should she find such insinuations operate, she will add her fraternal offers of emancipation, and enter into a similar offensive and defensive alliance with *Ireland* as she did with *America*.

Let Great Britain beware of presuming too much upon her own strength and our weakness.

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If there be a prudent jealousy in the British Constitution, respecting the disposal of the public purse; if the commons have been so tenacious of that right, that they will not suffer the lords even to make an addition to a pecuniary fine, laid on by them, will Ireland be satisfied to be taxed at the discretion of the British parliament? for such the imperial parliament must in fact be considered. I shall now shortly observe upon the circumstances of the two nations in respect of finance. A considerable increase of taxation must necessarily take place in Ireland, if she is to bear a part of the discharge of the British debt. I shall state its amount from Mr. Pitt's representation during the last session. Great Britain owes about *four hundred millions*. The annual charge arising from that debt, for interest and annuities, amounts to upwards of *twenty millions* and an half, of which four millions and an half are appropriated as a sinking fund; on the other hand, the annual charge upon Ireland for interest and annuities, amounts to somewhat more than one million one hundred thousand pounds, of which one hundred thousand pounds is applicable as a sinking fund. The rental of Great Britain scarcely reaches twenty-eight millions, and that of Ireland, whose contents are about one-third of those of Great Britain, may be estimated at about seven millions.

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Certain resolutions have been laid before his majesty by the parliament of Great Britain, stating the outlines of the intended Union, one of which, the 7th, applies to this part of the subject. It is therefore proposed, "*That the interest, or sinking fund, for the reduction of the principal of the debt incurred in either kingdom before the Union shall continue to be separately defrayed by Great Britain and Ireland respectively.*" This applies to that part only of the interest, which is appropriated as a sinking fund, but is totally *silent* in respect of the remaining part of the charge occasioned by their respective debts, the annual charge of which amounts to sixteen millions, to be paid by Great Britain, and to one million to be paid by Ireland. I should collect from the silence of ministry, upon a subject of such magnitude, that it is intended, that Ireland should be chargeable with, and subject to *some part* of that enormous debt. Should this take place, and the part to be paid by Ireland be proportioned to her rental, it might occasion an additional annual charge upon Ireland of two millions and an half. Additional taxes must then be laid on Ireland, to raise this enormous charge, which is far beyond her abilities to support. She will sink under the burthen, will grow desperate, and embrace the first opportunity of relief. The rapid encrease of debt in Ireland for these last two turbulent and disastrous years, has occasioned a great encrease of taxes, which the
poverty

poverty of her people feels already most heavily. But should such an addition to their taxes be made, as will be sufficient to raise this additional annual charge, it will in effect be putting Ireland into a state of requisition; and further, Ireland would not only suffer in the quantum of its amount, but also in its application. The whole sum so levied would be drawn out of this kingdom into Great Britain, and applied *there* to the discharge of her debt. Such a drain would gradually diminish, and in a few years annihilate the specie of Ireland; the course of exchange would come to be so high, that not a single guinea would be left in that kingdom. Commerce would cease from want of capital, bankruptcies ensue, and the taxes become unproductive, from the decay of trade. Great Britain would *too late* feel the impolicy of such a measure. If it is meant that Ireland should not be affected by the debt of Great Britain, it will require much ingenuity, indeed, to form such a plan of arrangement between the two nations, as shall secure each from being affected by the debt of the other, and more especially to secure Ireland, when it is considered that the power of taxing Ireland is to be vested in the united parliament, more properly to be called the *British* parliament, and that Great Britain is not to be affected by the taxes which shall be imposed upon Ireland. I would suppose that by the articles of Union, it should be agreed that Ireland should

should be indemnified against that debt, and thereupon consent to give up her only security, her own parliament. Can she expect that such articles will be adhered to longer than Great Britain shall find convenient? Is not self-interest the primary motive which governs the actions of one nation towards another? The *omnipotence* of parliament does not extend to prevent any future parliament from *repealing* or *altering* laws which former parliaments have enacted. Where is the tribunal to which Ireland can appeal, if such articles solemnly entered into by the present parliament shall be infringed by any succeeding parliament. There is none other which I know of but that of resorting to first principles, which God forbid should ever become necessary. Ireland knows, that while her own parliament subsists, her liberties are secure, and I trust, will have more good sense and virtue than to exchange the security she now has, for the *precarious tenure* of retaining her liberties so long as the parliament of Great Britain (for such I must ever consider the united parliament constituted in the manner proposed to be) shall be graciously pleased to permit her to enjoy them.

Having clearly shewn, that an Union to be formed agreeable to the outline laid before his Majesty, will not *identify* the two nations, but that all those *distinct* interests in pecuniary, and other matters, which I have pointed out, will
continue

continue as they do, under the now subsisting connexion between them. It is not in the nature of things, that *one parliament* should afford security to the liberties of two nations thus circumstanced.

Notwithstanding that it appears to *me* totally impracticable, that any Union can be formed between those nations, by which they shall be so perfectly identified, as that there shall not remain any distinct interest between them. Yet, as it may be possible, that persons of superior abilities may, contrary to my expectation, be able hereafter to suggest such a plan of Union between those two nations, as shall perfectly identify them, in which case one legislature may be well suited to their government. It will become a matter of much importance, that their parliament should be so formed, as to produce satisfaction to both nations, be best suited to the exercise of the legislative functions, and should most effectually secure the liberties of the people.

In an arrangement for the *perpetual Union* of two nations, much regard ought to be had to the feelings of the people, and it should at least carry the *appearance* of being adjusted upon the scale of equality. Wherefore then should the diminution of the numbers entirely fall upon the parliament of *one* of the nations to be united, whilst the parliament of the *other* shall remain perfect and entire? The Irish house of lords consisting of
about

230 is *intended* by the proposed plan, to be decreased six-sevenths of its members, who are thereby to be deprived of their *hereditary* right of sitting in parliament; and the Irish house of commons to be reduced two-thirds of its members. The proportion of the house of lords is to consist of nearly nine-tenths British, and one-tenth Irish members; and that of the commons five-sixths *British*, and one-sixth *Irish*. The circumstance of the numbers in the two houses being so disproportionate proves that they have not been adjusted upon any scientific principle of calculation, but are intended to be *dictated* to Ireland, not proportioned to her claim. If reference is had to the history of the Union with Scotland, it will appear, that consideration was had, both to the population and territorial property of the respective nations, from which the proportion of members for each nation was adjusted. That mode of proceeding was acting upon an acknowledged political principle, that of establishing their numbers according to their just claims. I shall not take upon myself to point out the just proportion to which each nation ought to be entitled, but shall state some extracts from the *statistical tables*, published in 1789, which not having been framed for any particular party purpose, may with propriety be resorted to for information. From these it appears, that the supposed population of South Britain is 8,100,000, that of Scotland,

land, *one million and an half*, and that of Ireland, *three millions forty thousand*. That the contents of South Britain are 54,112 square miles, that of Scotland 25,600 square miles, and that of Ireland 28,012 square miles, all English measure. I should suppose it not far from the truth, that the land contained in Ireland may be considered equal in point of value to the *average* of the lands contained in South and North Britain. It is observable, that at the time of the Union with Scotland, the English house of lords did not consist of more than one moiety of its present number, which occasioned the proportion of Scotch peers in the British house to be no more than sixteen. The British house of commons, consisting of 558 members, is already so unwieldy a body for a deliberative assembly, that it would be extremely inconvenient to add to its numbers so many as the proportion to which Ireland would be entitled. I shall therefore submit the following plan for consideration, as better suited to the mode of forming the house of commons, if such kingdoms should be united, than *that* of which it would be constituted, according to the arrangement herein before-mentioned.— In the first place, the due proportion should be ascertained to which Ireland ought to be entitled, the relative circumstances of each nation being justly compared with each other. I shall then recommend, that instead of adding such proportional number of Irish members to the British house

house of commons, so many of the representatives of the minor boroughs of Great Britain shall be struck off, as will make sufficient room for the number to be added to the house of commons as representatives for Ireland ; these to consist of two members for each county, great town and city, and of one representative for each of towns next in consequence to them. This plan will prevent the inconvenience of enlarging that body, rather too numerous in its present state, and it will produce a most essential *parliamentary reform*, by purging the house of commons of one moiety of the British representatives for such boroughs as have been considered as exceptionable, and its effect upon the *Irish part* of the representation will still *more* comprehensive, as thereby the *whole* number of the members representing their insignificant boroughs will be struck off. This reform will be effected without infringing any one constitutional principle. If the legislative functions for both nations shall be performed by *one parliament*, it is essential to the interests of the *empire*, that it be so arranged as to furnish the best possible security for the preservation of the constitutional liberties of the united nations. I shall again, however, repeat it, that where so many interests substantially distinct and incompatible as I have already pointed out, must necessarily subsist between the two kingdoms, it is not possible that the legislative functions for both nations can be

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performed

performed by *one* parliament with that equality and impartiality which might be expected from it, if those kingdoms were *perfectly identified*.— In respect of the house of lords, it may be proper to add to the British house, such number of Irish peers as may be their due proportion, according to the present number constituting the British house of peers; and provision should be made, that if the number of the peers should hereafter be encreased, such number should be added to the Irish peers to sit in such house, as should be necessary to preserve the same proportion.

There has lately been published a pamphlet, entitled, “Observations upon that part of the Speaker’s Speech which relates to Trade.” The author introduces several returns of the imports and exports from Great Britain and Ireland, for three years, ending the 5th January, 1799, according to the *current prices* of the imports from Ireland into Great Britain, made by Mr. Thomas Irvine, inspector general of the imports and exports of Great Britain. As I understand those returns, they state the current prices of the imports from Ireland, when brought into the *British market*. Those accounts were made out by the direction of Lord Auckland, and laid before the British house of lords. His object was, to shew how great the balance of trade carried on between the two kingdoms, was in *favour* of Ireland, which his lordship stated thus, “upon our entire
trade

trade with Ireland, the annual balance in her favour is above two millions*. The author of that pamphlet, adopting Lord Auckland's inference from said returns, states the balance of trade carried on between Great Britain and Ireland, to be £2,056,844 in favour of Ireland, which sum he alledges that Ireland annually *gains* by such trade.

In considering this subject, I shall suppose Mr. Irvine's returns correct, both in respect of the quantities of the commodities they relate to, and their respective values. Some mistakes may be noticed in them, which I attribute to errors in the press. It shall be my business to examine, whether the conclusion drawn from those returns be fallacious. In considering that question, I shall not enquire whether the articles included in such returns have been properly *named* by Mr. Foster, whether they are articles of the *first necessity*, or fall under this, or that description, but I shall take them merely as articles of commerce, without any distinction whatsoever.

These returns state the current price in the *British market* of the different articles imported from Ireland, and also the current prices in that market of the articles exported to Ireland, calculate their annual amount according to such prices, subtract the produce of the exports to

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Ireland,

* Woodfall, 537.

Ireland, from the produce of the imports from Ireland, and concludes that the difference between them is the amount of the gain of Ireland.

In order to form a proper judgment whether such conclusion be just, I shall analyse the sum produced in the British market upon the sale of the commodities imported from Ireland; it consists of four parts—the price paid in Ireland for those commodities, the expence of transportation to the London market, the profits of the merchant, and the customs paid upon their import. I am well informed that the average rate of insurance during those three years referred to, amounted to 4 per cent., taking therefore the whole expence of transportation at 5 per cent., must certainly under-rate it, which I choose to do to prevent cavil. I shall take the expence of transportation at 5 per cent., and estimate the merchant's profit according to that stated by Mr. Pitt, in computing the income tax at 15 per cent., and take the amount of the customs at £47,500 as stated by Lord Auckland. Those parts of the value of the commodities according to their prices in the British market return into the merchant's pocket, they cannot produce any gain to Ireland, and therefore ought to be deducted from such estimated value. The remainder will be the sum *actually* received by Ireland, as the price of her exported commodities; after deducting the amount of the customs paid, there will remain

main a sum of £5,565,189, five-sixths of which constitute the prime cost paid in Ireland, and one-sixth the twenty per cent. upon that sum thus,

	£.	s.
Prime cost paid in Ireland	4,637,627	10
20 per cent. upon such prime cost	927,561	10
Customs paid upon the import	47,500	0

Value as per Irvine's returns 5,612,689 0

These sums of £927,561 10s. and £47,500 making £975,061 10s. must be deducted from Mr. Irvine's return of balance,

	£.	s.
	2,056,844	0
	975,061	10

Leaves the real balance of } 1,081,782 10
trade in favour of Ireland,

An application to the inspector of imports and exports in the port of *London* was certainly well calculated, to magnify the apparent balance in favour of Ireland; I shall now state the balance, as it would have appeared upon similar returns made by the inspector of the imports and exports, in the port of *Dublin*, according to Mr. Irvine's mode of calculation.

	£.	s.
Price paid in Dublin for the } commodities exported from } thence into Great Britain.	4,637,627	10

Price

	£.	s.
Price paid in London for {the commodities exported to Ireland.	3,555,845	0
20 per cent. upon that sum	711,169	0
Customs upon their import into Ireland* as stated by Lord Auckland,	539,000	0
Produce in the Irish market	4,806,014	0
From above	4,637,627	10
Balance in favour of Great Britain.	168,386	10

The imports therefore from Great Britain would have produced £1,250,169 more in Dublin than what they cost in London, and a balance of £168,386 10s. would have been struck in *favour* of Great Britain, instead of £2,056,844 in *favour* of Ireland as stated from Mr. Irvine's returns. That balance however struck in favour of Great Britain would have been equally erroneous, with that struck by Mr. Irvine in favour of Ireland and for similar reasons. In my judgment the proper mode of ascertaining the balance of trade between two nations, is, by comparing the amount of the sums paid in their respective markets with each other, for the commodities exported by them. Mr. Irvine's returns state the amount

* Woodfall, 538.

amount of the value of the exports from Great Britain to Ireland at £. s.

	3,555,845	0	
I have shewn that the value of	}		
the exports from Ireland		4,637,627	10
amounted there to			

The real balance of trade is	}	
therefore		1,081,782

I am perfectly sensible, that the commerce between Great Britain and Ireland is a great advantage to Ireland, but I trust, that I have shewn that the balance in her favour has been greatly exaggerated, both by Lord Auckland and the author of that pamphlet. It is by this balance that Ireland is enabled to remit those large sums which are annually drawn into Great Britain by her absentees, the produce of whose estates Mr. Pitt states at one million.

I have thought it necessary that Great Britain should know what the real loss amounts to, which she sustains by her trade with Ireland, and that Ireland should be informed of the amount of the gain which arises to her, from her trade with Great Britain.

I have read with much astonishment that part of Lord Auckland's speech, wherein after stating from Mr. Irvine's returns, that the value of the imports into Great Britain from all the world amounted to £46,963,000, and that of her exports to £48,000,000, he concludes, that the balance of trade,

trade carried on by Great Britain with *all the world* amounts to one million in her favour*. Thus stating that the balance of trade between Great Britain and Ireland amounts in favour of Ireland to *double* that balance of trade which Great Britain has in her favour, from her immense commerce *with all the world*. That statement supported by the authority of a person of such distinguished abilities and clearness of understanding, and upon a subject to which he had directed his greatest attention, could not fail to make a strong impression upon the mind of every man who read it; certainly it at *first* produced that effect upon me, and yet I found it very difficult to reconcile it with the idea I had formed, of the immense wealth which Great Britain derived from her extensive trade with all the world, nor could I conceive it *possible* that Great Britain should not gain more from her trade with the *whole world* than *one half* of what Ireland gained from her trade with *Great Britain*. I had ever considered the balance of trade in favour of Great Britain as one of her principal resources, these considerations have led me to examine the nature of those returns, not without hope, that I should find that Lord Auckland's conclusion had arisen from some error or misconception. I do suppose that in Mr. Irvine's returns, the comparison of the trade of Great Britain with all the world is stated in the same manner, as that of the trade
between

* Woodfall, 537.

between Great Britain and Ireland, and consequently that the value of the imports is therein rated, according to their current prices, *after* their being brought into the British market. It gives me much satisfaction to find, that understanding thus, the nature of those returns I am enabled to remove the alarming impression which Lord Auckland's representation must have occasioned in the mind of every man who feels, with me, a warm interest in the prosperity and welfare of Great Britain. Upon examining those returns I find, that the same cause which produced the erroneous representation of the balance of trade between Great Britain and Ireland has occasioned the misstatement of that between Great Britain and the whole world, I have already shewn, that the only mode by which the balance of trade between two nations can be ascertained, is, by comparing the sums actually received by each nation respectively for the commodities exported by them. Mr. Irvine's returns of the amount of the imports, do not only include the sum paid for them in the countries from whence they came, but also the expence of their transportation, the customs upon their import and the merchant's profit; all these make part of the price which the purchaser pays for them in the British market, these additions do not confer any benefit upon the country from whence they are *exported*, or occasion any loss to

I

that

that country into which they are *imported*. I shall estimate the *average* charge of importation from the different parts of the world at ten per cent., which must in my judgment be much under-rated, when it is considered that the insurance *alone* from Ireland to Great Britain is *four* per cent. The amount of the customs paid upon the importation has been stated by Lord Auckland to amount to £6,897,500*, that sum must therefore be deducted from the sum of £46,963,000 the estimated value of the imports, the remainder will be £40,065,500 which sum is made up of the prime cost, the charge of transportation, and the merchant's profit. The merchant's profit, taken according to Mr. Pitt's estimate at 15 per cent. and being added to 10 per cent. (the expence of importation) making 25 per cent. that sum of £40,065,500 will be divided thus :

First cost,	-	-	£32,052,400
Expence of importation and mer-			
chant's profit, making 25 per			
cent upon that sum,			8,013,100

			40,065,500
Amount of customs,	-	-	6,897,500

Value of imports by Irvine's return, £46,963,000

The *prime* costs therefore of the *imports* compared with the *prime* cost of the *exports*, will give the amount of the real balance of trade in favour of Great Britain :

Prime

* Woodfall, 543.

Prime cost of exports from		
Great Britain,	-	- 1.48,000,000
Prime cost of imports,	-	32,052,400
Balance of trade in favour of } Great Britain,	-	1.15,947,600

The amount of the imports from the West Indies have been very properly introduced in Mr. Irvine's returns, as constituting a part of the balance of trade. However, the greater part thereof, instead of occasioning any *loss* to Great Britain, constitutes a considerable part of her *resources*; they are in fact remittances to the absentee proprietors in *commodities* instead of *money*. Mr. Pitt states their amount at five millions nett, taxable as income; these added to the above balance of trade and the million annually remitted from Ireland to her absentees, occasion an annual *influx* of money into Great Britain of nearly twenty-two millions. These are the resources which have enabled Great Britain to supply the state with those immense sums which have been raised during the present war.

The measure which has been under consideration is so momentous in its consequences, and so complicated in its nature, that it requires the most attentive investigation. I have endeavoured to examine it in its various ramifications, and to view it in its different bearings. I have particularly attended to your Lordship's position, that the *only mode* of connexion which can remove the
evil

evil of separation, or confer the benefit of Union,
 is a *perfect identity* of government. This you
 lay down as the *criterion* to determine whether
 such Legislative Union ought to be formed be-
 tween these two nations. For this purpose I have
 examined the nature of the connexion intended
 to be formed, agreeable to the outlines laid before
 his Majesty by the Parliament of Great Britain,
 from which it clearly appears, that if such con-
 nexion shall take place, every distinctness in re-
 venue, taxation and expenditure *now* subsisting
 between the two kingdoms will continue, and con-
 sequently, that they will not be thereby *identified*.
 I therefore consider myself justified by your
 Lordship's authority in asserting, that such Union
 ought not to be adopted; it has been shewn, that
 the great object of the minister in the pursuit of
 this measure, is to acquire the command over
 the purse of Ireland. This will be procured by
 the Union, through the immense majority of
 British members in the united Parliament. Should
 an Union take place, Ireland will be chargeable
 with a proportion of the expences of the empire,
 her own sinking fund, and *at least* the interest of
 her own debt. Taxes must necessarily be laid on
 for providing for such expences which shall ex-
 tend to *that kingdom* only, they will be imposed
nominally by the united Parliament, but *actually*
 by the majority of British members in such Par-
 liament. Of the taxes thus *confined* to Ireland in
 their

their operation, those British members will not feel the pressure, nor will either *they* or *those whom they represent* be in any sort affected by them. By the Constitution the power of taxation is lodged in those who are to pay them, *the people*; this arrangement furnishes a security, that such power shall not be improperly encreased, but that constitutional check will here be *undermined*, and the *people of Ireland* will be taxed by the *representatives* of another people, who do not *participate* in the burthens they *impose*. Although unaccustomed to write, I have ventured to lay my thoughts before the public, in the plain language of common sense upon that momentous question, which must determine whether Ireland shall continue to enjoy a free Constitution, or become a province of Great Britain. I shall now with all due respect take my leave of your Lordship, relying upon the good sense of my Countrymen, that they will resist this ruinous measure.

FARNHAM.

THE END.

ERRATA.

Page	Line	
3	6	For <i>empires</i> , read <i>empiricks</i> .
5	21	For <i>difference</i> , read <i>differences</i> .
7	11	For <i>restoring</i> , read <i>resorting</i> .
8	11	For <i>perpealy</i> , read <i>perfectly</i> .
21	6	Dele <i>appears</i> .
26	3	For <i>injustly</i> , read <i>unjustly</i> .
28	5	For <i>in</i> , read <i>is</i> .
32	18	For <i>securing</i> , read <i>pecuniary</i> .
36	17	For <i>stationary</i> , read <i>starving</i> .
39	13	For <i>had</i> , read <i>paid</i> .

6 DE 58